Two non-interactive three parties k out of n oblivious transfer protocols k n OT (where 0<k<n) from bilinear pairings are proposed in this paper. In these protocols, a sender can obliviously transfer n messages to a receiver without communication with him/her. The public keys that a sender used to encrypt his/her messages are made by a third party. The receiver can extract k out of n messages at his/her choices by using the corresponding secret keys. The choices of the receiver are unconditionally secure. The sender's secrecy is guaranteed if the receiver is semi-honest in the standard model since the decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (DBDH) is hard and the sender's secrecy is achieved when the receiver is a malicious party in the random oracle model since the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem assumption (BDHA) holds. When a sender is a cheating party, the receiver will detect him/her and halt the protocol. A precise proof of the security of the protocols is presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of oblivious transfer (OT) was first introduced by M. Rabin in 1981 [1] . Rabin's OT can be described as a game of two polynomial time parties S (sender) and R (receiver). S sends one secret s (one bit) to R, with 1/2 probability that R will receive s and with 1/2 probability that R will receive nothing; but S does not know which event will happen. Rabin's initiative has attracted a lot of attention. Various OT forms have been subsequently proposed.1-out-2 oblivious transfer protocol 1 2 OT [2] , in the protocol, S has two messages 1 m and 2 m , and would like R to obtain exactly one of them. In addition, S remains oblivious to R's choice. Non-interactive oblivious transfer protocol [3] , in a slightly informal version, a non-interactive oblivious transfer protocol is a means that any S can obliviously transfer secret(s) to such a R, who without the recipient's having to take any action at all. 1-out-n oblivious transfer protocol 1 n OT proposed soon after in the name "All-ornothing disclosure of secrets" [4] . After that, 1 n OT has become an important research topic in cryptographic protocols design. Some 1 n OT are designed by invoking basis 1 2 OT schemes several times [5, 6] . For k-out-n oblivious transfer protocol k n OT , Bellare and Micali [3] proposed an 1 n n OT − , Noar and Pinkas proposed a nontrival k n OT protocol [7] .The scheme is built by invoking a basis 1 2 OT scheme several times. Chu and Tzeng [8] proposed another k n OT scheme based on DDH problem. Mu, Zhang and Varadharajan [9] designed some efficient k n OT schemes from cryptographic functions directly. Yao, Bao and Deng [10] pointed out some security issues in [9] . For oblivious transfer protocols, the most efficient one is non-interactive one.
Oblivious transfer protocol has been studied extensively and in many forms. Most of them consider the case that R chooses one message. In this paper, we consider k-out-n oblivious transfer for strings. In the setting, a sender S holds n messages 1 2 , ,... n m m m and is willing to disclose exactly k of them to a receiver R. The indices { } . Oblivious transfer protocol can be used as stand-alone protocols, e.g. for trading digital information, or as a building block for more complex protocols, e.g. for secure two-party computations, privacy-preserving auctions and oblivious polynomial evaluation. It is used as a key component in many applications of cryptography. It has proven to be a powerful tool in the design of cryptographic protocols; also it is an important sub-protocol of many cryptographic protocols since its introduction by Rabin in 1981 [11, 12, 13, 14, 15] . Moreover, oblivious is necessary and sufficient for secure multi-party computations [13, 16] .
As a key component in many applications of cryptography, its computational requirements are quite demanding and they are likely to be the bottleneck in many protocols that invoke OT. The analysis of the construction relies on the assumption that determining quadratic residue is hard or decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is hard. In the literature, the sender and the receiver are honest or semi-honest parties (passive parties). Even in the malicious situation, the sender is honest or semi-honest [8, 17, 18] . In the investigation of OT we encountered two problems, one is the OT protocols' efficiency, and the other is the security.
A. Contributions
In this paper we first introduce a three parties OT, where the third party T in an oblivious transfer protocol is same as a Private Key Generator (PKG) in IBE [19] , whose sole purpose is to give R a "personalized smart card" as his/her secret key and generate the public key corresponding to the secret key. Using the secret key R can extract k out of n strings that S obliviously transfers with his/her public key. Then we propose two secure and efficient k n OT protocols for any 2 n ≥ from bilinear pairings over elliptic curves. R's secrecy is unconditional. S's secrecy is guaranteed if the decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (DBDH) is hard when R is semihonest. S's secrecy is achieved in the random oracle model since the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem assumption (BDHA) holds when R is a malicious party. We do not need any commitment or zero-knowledge proof in the protocols. Therefore we avoid large workload of computations. Our results are along the current trend of research on the design of cryptographic protocols, which is to find provable-secure practical protocols.
We will define malicious oblivious transfer protocol and give two protocols that satisfy this kind of definition. When R is an adversary (passive or active), he/she can not get any information on the not-chosen messages. When S is a cheating party, who bluffs in the protocol, R will detect him/her and stop execution of the protocol. To the best of our knowledge, our methods have not been considered previously in the literature.
B. Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section briefly introduces the definition of k n OT , noninteractive k n OT and three parties OT, the bilinear maps and the Deffie-Hellamn problem assumptions. Section III will give a detailed description of our non-interactive three parties oblivious transfer protocol k n OT and we will analyze the security of our protocols k n OT in Section IV, we will give the conclusions of the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This paper focuses on variants of k-out-n oblivious transfer protocol k n OT .
A. Parties
The involved parties of an k n OT protocol are a sender S and a receiver R. Both are polynomial-time bounded probabilistic parties. A party is semi-honest (or passive) if he/she does not deviate from the steps defined in the protocol, but tries to compute extra information from the received messages. A party is malicious (or active) if he/she can deviate from the specified steps in any way in order to get extra information.
A malicious sender may change the order or contents of his/her messages. We call this kind of malicious sender cheating party. The symbol ⊥ meanings S's outputs is nothing.
A non-interactive oblivious transfer protocol is a means by which any sender S can obliviously transfer messages to such an R who does not take any action at all. A little more formally, non-interactive oblivious transfer protocol is defined as follows: S has n secrets 1 2 , ,... n m m m , R has some public keys that S uses to compute messages 1 2 , ,..., n c c c and sends them to R while R does not send any messages to S. R can extract k out of them from these messages at his/her choices. S will not know which of them R got.
A three parties OT is defined as that: there are three parties, a sender, a receiver and a private key generator (PKG). The keys that S used to encrypt his/her messages are made by the third party PKG.
C. Bilinear maps and the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption
1 G and 2 G are two groups of order q, where q is some large prime. 1 G is an additive group and 2 G is a multiplicative group. 0 is an identity for 1 G and 1 is an
is a map satisfying the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: where the advantage is that 
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In order to define security we discuss separately protecting the sender S and the receiver R. Since we can not offer both S and R unconditional protection, we provide only computational protection for one of them. S is protected computationally and R unconditionally. Only honest third party T is considered in this paper. In 
III. NON-INTERACTIVE THREE PARTIES OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER PROTOCOLS
In this section, we will give the details of two noninteractive three parties oblivious transfer protocols k n OT from bilinear pairings. A sender S obliviously transfers n messages to a receiver R. R can extract k out of n messages at his/her choices by using his/her private keys without communication with S. One important typical feature of our schemes is that the keys which S uses to encrypt the messages are made by the third party T. Thus we have improved the sender S's security and we give detailed proof of this claim. Another important typical feature of our schemes is that we give an k n OT protocol when the sender S is a cheating party. Initialization: The third party T, as a Private Key Generator (PKG) in IBE [19] , using the security parameter κ , generates 1 G , 2 G of order of q, 1 G is an additive group and 2 G is a multiplicative group, and a bilinear map: ˆ: OT schemes [1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 17, 18] , the key that S used to encrypt his/her messages was made by R himself/herself. Therefore if R is a malicious party, he/she may get more information from the cipher-texts S sent to him/her. So S's security is trustless. In our protocol, the key that S used to encrypt his/her messages was made by the third party T, so we enhance the degree of S's security. ), we can find an algorithm to solve the BDH problem.
A.
Proof of Theorem 3.2: We will show that for each possible malicious R, we can construct a simulator R * in the ideal-model such that the outputs of R and R * are indistinguishable if BDH problem is hard and 1 H is a random oracle.
The simulator R * simulates both the sender S (externally, without knowing 1 2 , ,..., n m m m ) and R. R * works as follows: 2. R * simulates S (externally, without knowing 1 2 , ,..., n m m m ) to obtain 1 2 , ,..., n r r r * * * and 1 2 , ,..., n g g g * * * .
3. R * randomly chooses 1 2 , ,..., There are numerous applications of OT and k n OT [1, 3, 12, 23] . Straightforward applications of the proposed k n OT are in electronic commerce. For example, we can construct an online video shop based on our k n OT protocols, which achieves the private transaction (which hiding from vendors what items clients are buying, or even whether at a given moment they are buying anything at all, being unable to learn for vendors what the clients' current balance is or when it actually runs out of its funds) of digital products, such as films, music, software and etc.. In this scenario, S is now the vendor who wants to sell videos over the Internet, while his/her clients who are considered as R can get what they want without revealing which ones they have selected.
Aiello,Ishai and Reingold [23] , Christian Tobias [24] presented techniques to reach this goal by using oblivious transfer protocols.
